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Abstract
Scale norming is where respondents use qualitatively different scales to answer the same 
question across survey waves. It makes responses challenging to compare intertemporally 
or interpersonally. This paper develops a formal model of the cognitive process that could 
give rise to scale norming in year on year responses to life satisfaction scale questions. 
It then uses this model to conceptually differentiate scale norming from adaptation and 
changes in reference points. Scale norming could make life satisfaction responses mis-
leading with regards to the changing welfare of individuals. In particular, individuals who 
would say that their life is "improving" or "going well" might nonetheless give the same 
scale response year after year. This has negative implications for the use of scales in cost–
benefit analysis and other welfarist applications. While there is already substantial empiri-
cal evidence for the existence of scale norming, its implications for welfare analysis are 
sometimes understated on the grounds that this evidence might simply be the product of 
errors of memory. The paper presents new empirical evidence for scale norming from two 
surveys  (N1 = 278; N2 = 1050) designed such that errors of memory are an unconvinc-
ing explanation for the results.
Keywords Subjective well-being · Welfare analysis · Life satisfaction · Adaptation · Scale 
norming · Response shift
JEL Classification I3 · I31
1 Introduction
Scale norming is where the qualitative meaning of the points on a respondent’s scale 
changes between survey waves (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). Stillman et al.’s (2015) 
study of Tongan migrants to New Zealand provides an illustrative example of scale norm-
ing. New Zealand uses a lottery system to allocate visas to would-be migrants from Tonga. 
Around 10% of applicants are successful and migrate to New Zealand, where they typically 
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experience meaningful increases in their real incomes. Stillman et al. survey both success-
ful and unsuccessful applicants 2–5 years after the lottery. One survey question is the ‘wel-
fare ladder’, as follows:
Please imagine a 10-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest, 
and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step are you today?
This is a scale question where the meanings of ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ and the intervening 
points on the ladder are subjective and need to be defined through a cognitive exercise 
when answering the question. In addition to this ‘welfare ladder’ question, the successful 
applicants (migrants) were asked which step of the ladder they were on when they were 
last living in Tonga. Despite their objectively higher on average real incomes, the migrants 
report being no higher on the welfare ladder than the unsuccessful applicants. However, 
they report being 0.75 rungs higher on average than they were when last living in Tonga. 
In other words, they seem to think that they are better off now than before, yet they give the 
same scale response.
At first, this may seem like a straightforward case of changing reference points. While 
the migrants are wealthier in New Zealand, they are also surrounded by wealthier peo-
ple. They consequently adjust their evaluation of their old life downward. But imagine if 
the question were phrased differently: “are you on a higher step now than you were pre-
viously?”. The answer is surely yes. This improvement is obfuscated by the fact that the 
reporting scale used shifts between waves of the survey. The scale response doesn’t change, 
but the scale does, masking a real improvement in subjectively-assessed welfare. This is 
scale norming. Reference point changes (Easterlin & Plagnol, 2008), adaptation (Luhmann 
et al., 2012), and scale norming are hard to tease apart, as discussed in Sect. 2, below.
Consider how the migrants’ reporting on the welfare ladder would play out if it were 
a life satisfaction ladder instead. Assume that rather than increases in real incomes, the 
migrants had experienced increases in latent life satisfaction. However, they had also dis-
covered new life satisfaction possibilities in New Zealand, which causes them to reconcep-
tualise their scale. The outcome is then equivalent: latent life satisfaction increases by 0.75 
steps, but the scale response doesn’t change, the scale itself changes instead. If you asked 
the migrant “are you more satisfied with life now than you were in Tonga?” the answer 
would again be yes.
This is important for welfare economics. Some scholars advocate for life satisfaction 
scale data to be our principle way of measuring social progress (Clark et al., 2018; Diener 
& Seligman, 2004). This seems fraught if a substantial portion of improvements in latent 
life satisfaction do not show up in the data because of scale norming. The phenomenon is 
even more pernicious to cost–benefit analysis using life satisfaction scale data, which some 
scholars have advocated for (Frijters et al., 2019; Fujiwara & Dolan, 2016). Cost–benefit 
analysis relies on precise, cardinal, interpersonal welfare comparisons (Adler, 2013). If the 
welfare effects of some changes are more or less susceptible to scale norming, or if certain 
groups are more or less prone to scale norm, then this will inject bias into measures and 
distort the conclusions of cost–benefit analyses.
There is substantial empirical evidence for the existence of scale norming (Schwarz & 
Sprangers, 2000), but it does not seem to be widely appreciated as a problem among sub-
jective well-being scholars. This is perhaps because of a tendency to see patterns in lon-
gitudinal life satisfaction data that could represent scale norming as evidence of various 
cognitive biases instead. For example, the first four waves of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) included a scale question for present satisfaction and a second question for 
satisfaction in the previous year. The correlation between the retrospective question and 
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the actual response in the previous year is only 0.5. Similarly, waves 16 and 17 of the Brit-
ish Household Panel Survey (BHPS) include both a life satisfaction scale question and the 
following: “would you say you are more satisfied with life, less satisfied with life, or feel 
about the same as you did a year ago?”. This is a straightforward question about whether 
life is better now than before. The correlation between this question and life satisfaction 
scale responses is only 0.22. These data points may indicate scale norming, but subjective 
well-being scholars tend to interpret them instead as evidence for recall bias or errors of 
memory (Prati & Senik, 2020), effort justification (Howard & Dailey, 1979), and implicit 
theories of change (Norman, 2003).
This behavioural economic lens needs to be tempered with a more cognitive psycho-
logical perspective. Subjective well-being scholars perhaps assume that life satisfaction 
questions are cognitively simple to answer because respondents do so quickly (Diener 
et al., 2013; Stone & Mackie, 2013). Yet speed of cognition tells us little about complex-
ity. Assessing one’s latent life satisfaction and then reporting it on a scale in a way that is 
consistent over time is potentially very difficult. This cognitive process is largely untheo-
rized and has received limited empirical investigation (McClimans et al., 2012). Analysing 
the cognitive complexity of answering life satisfaction scale questions, as this paper does, 
reveals that scale norming is just as valid an interpretation of many patterns in life satisfac-
tions data as cognitive biases in responding. Indeed, many of the claimed biases in respond-
ing may instead be a function of the measurement instrument rather than human cognition. 
Notably, if latent life satisfaction is not on a scale from 1 to 10 then asking people to report 
on such a scale requires them to contort their answers in some way, especially over multi-
ple surveys. Such bias-by-instrument rather than cognition is what is implied, though not 
conclusively demonstrated, by the Stillman et al. (2015) study of migrant assessments of 
wealth, which can be measured objectively, unlike life satisfaction. It is quite possible that 
respondents are communicating with researchers as effectively as they can given the con-
straints of life satisfaction scale metrics, but a “bias bias” (Gigerenzer, 2018) on the part of 
researchers prevents respondents from being heard effectively.
This paper advances the scholarship of scale norming in two separate ways. The first 
half of the paper provides conceptual clarification. It further develops Fleurbaey and Blan-
chet’s (2013) model of what Oswald (2008) calls the ‘reporting function’. This is the cogni-
tive process that maps latent life satisfaction into a numerical response on a life satisfaction 
scale. This model gives us a sense of what goes on, cognitively and linguistically, when 
respondents answer life satisfaction scale questions and illuminates how these processes 
could give rise to scale norming. The paper uses the model to conceptually distinguish 
scale norming from adaptation and reference point effects. The paper then reviews empiri-
cal evidence for the existence of scale norming, principally from the vignettes and response 
shift literature. The possibility of scale norming is often difficult to disentangle from other 
cognitive phenomena associated with subjective reports, notably recall bias, implicit theo-
ries of change, and effort justification. The paper explains why the latter two of these phe-
nomena are fundamental to the reporting function and thus not good reasons to dismiss 
concerns about scale norming. This leaves recall bias as the main alternative explanation 
for trends in life satisfaction data that might indicate scale norming.
The second half of the paper provides new empirical evidence for the existence of scale 
norming from an experiment that is substantially robust to errors of memory critiques. 
Results from two samples (N1 = 277; N2 = 1050), one purposive and the other representa-
tive, both indicate widespread scale norming. The results suggest that individuals can 
say that their life is getting better even when their year-on-year life satisfaction responses 
are identical. This affirms the concern outlined above that scale norming can obfuscate 
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subjectively-assessed improvements in life satisfaction over time, with pernicious implica-
tions for welfare analysis. This experiment is not a test of the conceptual framework pre-
sented in the first half of the paper. However, it repudiates the claim that scale norming is 
not worth investigating further as it can easily be explained as an error of memory.
2  The Reporting Function
The ‘reporting function’ is a cognitive process that translates latent life satisfaction into 
a response on a scale question (Oswald, 2008). To get a handle on it, imagine two high 
school teachers, one considered a ‘generous’ grader and the other more ‘stringent’. It’s pos-
sible that both teachers assess the quality of a student’s work and rank it relative to class-
mates identically, but nonetheless assign different grades to that work. Similarly, people 
could have generous or stringent reporting functions and consequently communicate their 
identical assessments of life satisfaction differently on a scale instrument.
Pavot and Diener (1993) gave one of the first informal descriptions of the reporting 
function. They describe the process of making a life satisfaction evaluation as involving 
the individual constructing a “standard” that they perceive as appropriate for themselves, 
and then comparing the circumstances of their life to that standard. Fleurbaey and Blanchet 
(2013) developed a more formal and sophisticated model of “subjective well-being as it 
can be retrieved with typical questionnaires” (pg. 175).
Fleurbaey and Blanchet’s model takes the following form. They begin with a vector, 
l
i
 , that covers “the diversity of states, activities and possibilities enjoyed or endured by an 
individual [i] over the course of their life” (p. 175). When someone answers a life satisfac-
tion questionnaire, they consider l
i
 and there is some function, i , that maps this vector, 
including the individual’s actual life, l∗
i
 , into possible responses to the scale question, ri . As 
Fleurbaey and Blanchet explain: 
ξi(li) must lie in a given scale, which can be a verbal scale (e.g. very satisfied/fairly 
satisfied/not very satisfied/not at all satisfied), or a numerical scale (e.g. from 0 to 
10). The cognitive problem for the individual is to put the many dimensions of liinto 
one of a few ordered categories.
The reporting function maps the entire vector l
i
 into the entire scale,ri . So we can let 
rit ∈ {1, 2, ..., k, ...,K} denote the choice of response category to a single life satisfaction 
scale survey item with K response options. However, the individual’s own life,l∗
i
 , maps 
into a single response category,r∗
i
 . The individual’s response to a life satisfaction question 
is thus given byr∗
i
= i(li) . The challenge for the respondent is to communicate the com-
plexity of their life satisfaction assessments,l
i
 , within the constraints of the scale instru-
ment. The challenge for researchers is to infer l∗
i




 despite the messiness 
introduced by the reporting function. Fleurbaey and Blanchet identify three separate but 
related problems that are likely to plague such exercises: the scope, ranking, and calibra-
tion problems.
The scope problem concerns what aspects of li are relevant for the individual to con-
sider. For example, what time frame is appropriate—today, this week, the time since the 
last survey? Should the state of the household be considered or just the individual? What 
about the state of the world in general?
The scope problem would give rise to scale-norming if respondents used inconsistent 
scopes across survey waves. When surveyed at the end of the financial year in wave 1 
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they may focus on their business, for example, whereas when surveyed around Christ-
mas in wave 2 they might focus on their family. The points on the scales used in these 
two waves will have widely divergent meanings, which makes comparing responses on 
them questionable.
Where the scope problem is about what to consider when assessing one’s life satis-
faction, the ranking problem is about how to weight those various considerations against 
each other. It is cognitively difficult to arrange relevant possible lives (e.g.  1a,  1b, etc.), 
including the individual’s actual life, li*, into an ordinal pattern (e.g.  11–19), especially 
as there are many possible lives to consider. This is represented graphically in Fig. 1.
The complexity of the ranking exercise may induce respondents to focus on sali-
ent aspects of their immediate situation and forget other relevant dimensions of their 
life. The ‘focusing illusion’ is a famous example of this (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). 
Respondents may focus on, say, the poor weather in their area and fail to take into con-
sideration relatively low local living costs. SW-B scholars hope that avoiding explicit 
primes through smart survey design will mitigate this issue (Stone & Mackie, 2013). An 
example of an explicit prime is given by Deaton and Stone (2016). They found that ask-
ing about politics prior to life satisfaction reduces life satisfaction responses. However, 
it’s unclear that removing explicit primes negates the ranking problem. Even without 
external primes, respondents will frame their life in terms of whatever is bothering them 
at the time of the survey. These preoccupations may differ between surveys, giving rise 
to scale norming. For example, if the survey is taken during a difficult month at work, 
those difficult circumstances could crowd out the good salary, colleagues, and commute 
Fig. 1  The ranking problem. Notes: Respondents must arrange possible lives they could live, of which there 
are theoretically an infinite number, into an ordered ranking from least to most satisfying
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that dominate work assessments on the other 11 months of the year. During the good 
work months, the qualitative meaning of the points on the respondent’s scale might be 
determined by household issues instead.
The calibration problem is about how the individual maps their ranking of possible 
lives, including their own life, l∗
i
 , into the limited number of response categories availa-
ble on the survey question. It is depicted graphically in Fig. 2. There is a strong framing 
effect present that arises out of the fact that the scale offered is closed. This contrasts with 
real life, where many considerations relevant to life satisfaction are open, like income, or 
have fuzzy limits, like career progression. The closed scale forces respondents “to move 
from reasoning in terms of life content to a reasoning in terms of a statistical distribu-
tion” (Fleurbaey & Blanchet, 2013, p. 181). The calibration problem is which distribution 
to choose. For example, should the respondent choose from among the lives available to all 
humans, including Lebron James, or rather from among those that seem realistically pos-
sible for themselves? Different calibrations across respondents and over time could create 
arguably incomparable responses.
An empirical example of the calibration problem comes from Ubel et  al. (2005). 
They tested how respondents assess their health relative to “perfect health” when explic-
itly asked about perfect health for “a 20-year-old” or “someone your own age”. They 
found that unprimed respondents interpret perfect health somewhere between perfect 
Fig. 2  The calibration problem. 
Notes: The calibration problem 
involves mapping the many 
possible lives individuals might 
consider when evaluating their 
own life into the limited number 
of response categories on the 
scale instrument
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health for a 20-year-old and someone their own age. As people age, this scale meaning-
fully changes such that an 80-year old has a different scale in mind than a 40-year old. 
A corollary point is that an 80-year old’s response scale would differ from the scale they 
used when they were 60.
The calibration problem is one explanation for why introverts and extroverts differ 
in their life satisfaction, on average (Diener & Lucas, 1999). Consider two individuals, 
A and B. Assume that they have identical latent life satisfaction, but A is introverted 
while B is extroverted. If this personality difference only affects reporting (by a positiv-
ity bias among extroverts, for example) and not latent life satisfaction (by extroverts 
having more friends, for example), then A would map their latent life satisfaction more 
stringently into lower responses to a scale question than B, who maps relatively gener-
ously. This is depicted graphically in Fig. 3.
Both A and B make the same assessment of their wellbeing; they just report it differ-
ently. Our measurement of their SWB is biased by our inattention to the reporting func-
tion. To understand why this is pernicious to interpersonal welfare comparisons, con-
sider the following: assuming the difference between introverts and extroverts is purely 
a matter of reporting style, would the world have more wellbeing if all introverts were 
somehow converted to extroverts? More pointedly, should more policy effort be directed 
at introverts given their lower scale reports? The answer to both questions seems intui-
tively to be no.
Fig. 3  Differences in calibration styles, e.g. between introverts and extroverts. Notes: individuals who differ 
in their calibration style (for example, stringent or generous) may map identical subjective life satisfaction 
assessments into different response categories
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, but we can only ever observe r∗
i
= (li) . Furthermore, both li* and ξi(li) could 
change over time such that responses to life satisfaction scale questions become neither 
inter-temporally nor inter-personally comparable, even ordinally. This may go some way to 
explaining why scale responses have low test–retest coefficients of 0.5–0.7 over even short 
periods of 1 day to 2 weeks (Krueger & Schkade, 2008).
3  Distinguishing Scale Norming from Adaptation and Reference Points
The reporting function helps to illuminate the differences between scale norming, adapta-
tion, and changing reference points. Scale norming is depicted graphically in Fig. 4. The 
y-axis tracks latent life satisfaction1 numerically. This is somewhat at odds with Fleurbaey 
and Blanchet’s model, which describes life satisfaction as a vector, that is, having only 
a magnitude and a direction (from low to high perhaps). A numerical scale is used here 
only for convenience to aid discussion—it allows for straightforward comparisons between 
latent life satisfaction and responses to life satisfaction scale questions. The x-axis tracks 
annual waves of a survey, such as HILDA or the GSOEP. In Fig. 5, the individual’s latent 
life satisfaction does not change across the 5 waves of the survey, staying consistently at 
7. However, the scale they use does. In time 1, for example, they report 4/10, whereas in 
time 2 they report 6/10. Perhaps they calibrate their scale differently in these two survey 
instances. The result of this scale norming is apparent volatility in the respondent’s life 
Fig. 4  Scale norming. Notes: Scale norming is where the qualitative meaning of the response categories on 
a respondent’s scale (represented by the 1–10 vertical lines) changes over time. As a result, responses (the 
bold numbers) vary over time even as life satisfaction (the trend line) remains constant
1 It is an open question whether life satisfaction is latent, like intelligence, or constructed in response to a 
question, like an opinion. For ease of graphical representation, the discussion here assumes that latent life 
satisfaction exists and can be quantified, at least ordinally.
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satisfaction, but this interpretation is entirely the product of incorrectly assuming identical 
scales across waves. 
One potential source of scale norming is ceiling effects (Wang et  al., 2008). This is 
where an individual lacks space within the extreme regions of their scale to communi-
cate further improvements or declines in their life satisfaction. It is depicted graphically in 
Fig. 5. The respondents begins in wave 1 with a high latent life satisfaction of 7, which they 
report directly as 7/10 on their scale. Their satisfaction continues to rise over time. At first, 
they can translate these improvements to their scale response, reporting 8/10 in wave 2. But 
then eventually they reach a point where they should report 10/10 on their original scale. 
This would make it impossible to communicate even more improvement in their satisfac-
tion, which they can foresee. Additionally, in the context of Cantril’s ladder type questions, 
they may not want to imply that they have reached their “best possible life”. In conse-
quence, they alter their scale rather than their response, once again reporting 8/10, except 
that now this corresponds to a higher level of satisfaction than the 8/10 they reported in 
wave 2. They continue to report 8/10 in successive waves even as their latent life satisfac-
tion continues to rise. Researchers inattentive to scale norming might incorrectly infer that 
this respondent’s life satisfaction is not rising over time. Ceiling effects are consistent with 
results from Rasch analysis of life satisfaction scales, which find that scale use is insensi-
tive at high response categories (Schutte et  al. 2019). Ceiling effects might explain why 
it appears exceedingly difficult to raise average life satisfaction above 8/10 in advanced 
nations (Clark et al., 2018)—latent satisfaction may in fact be rising, but it is covered up by 
scale norming.
Adaptation is about acclimatising to shocks that affect latent life satisfaction. In con-
trast to scale norming, it involves a real change in life assessment, rather than being 
a reporting or measurement artefact. Adaptation is depicted graphically in Fig. 6. The 
individual suffers a negative shock to their life satisfaction in wave 3; perhaps they burn 
their forearm and the skin is permanently affected with scarring. This drops their latent 
Fig. 5  Ceiling effects. Notes: Ceiling effects are when a lack of space to communicate further changes at the 
extreme ends of a scale (here the upper end) triggers scale norming
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life satisfaction to 3 and their scale response to 3/10. Over the next two waves of the 
survey, they acclimatise to this shock and their life satisfaction rises commensurately. 
Perhaps they become accustomed to the sight of their skin and are no longer embar-
rassed by people’s reaction to it. In any case, by wave 5 they are back at their original 
satisfaction of 7 and scale response of 7/10. Importantly, no change in objective circum-
stances is responsible for the adaptation. The scar remains. There is also no scale norm-
ing. Adaptation is not about how one reports one’s life satisfaction, but about how one 
feels about things that once affected one’s life satisfaction. Adaptation and scale norm-
ing stem from different cognitive phenomena.
Life satisfaction reporting is further complicated by changing reference points. This is 
where scale norming causes a change in latent life satisfaction. Reference point shifts are 
the fundamental mechanism of many positive psychology interventions. Consider gratitude 
(Emmons & McCullough, 2004). This technique involves reflecting on the positive things 
in your life to make them more cognitively salient. For example, during COVID induced 
lockdowns we might focus on how grateful we are not to be ill rather than our inability to 
go to the gym. This deliberate, conscious effort to adjust the standard by which we assess 
our life causes a real improvement in feelings. This reference point shift is depicted graphi-
cally in Fig. 7. The individual initially suffers a decline in latent life satisfaction with the 
onset of lockdown between waves 1–2. There is no scale change. They then practice grati-
tude. This results in scale norming in wave 3: the scale shifts downwards, indicating a more 
generous reporting style. This scale norming causes a real change in feelings, with latent 
life satisfaction rising. The dashed line indicates where life satisfaction would have been 
had there been scale norming without an attendant change in feelings. The causal channel 
from scale norming to changes in latent satisfaction is essential to the definition of refer-
ence points shifts. An individual could scale norm while experiencing an unrelated change 
in life satisfaction. They could change their scope from themselves to their family while 
being happier about their progress in a hobby, for example. This would not be a reference 
point shift.
To summarise:
Fig. 6  Adaptation. Notes: Adaptation involves real changes in latent life satisfaction rather than reporting 
style. Even as the scale (the horizontal bars) remains fixed over time, life satisfaction varies due to acclima-
tising to the shock in wave 2
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• Scale norming is where the qualitative meaning of the points on a respondent’s scale 
change over time. It does not involve a change in latent life satisfaction. It instead 
reflects a change in reporting style. More formally, scale norming involves a change in 
i rather than a change in l∗i  relative to li.
• Adaptation is where an individual acclimatises to shocks to their life satisfaction over 
time. This a change in latent life satisfaction ( l∗
i
 relative to l
i
) not a change in reporting 
style ( i).
• Reference point shifts are where scale norming causes a change in latent life satisfac-
tion. The causal channel is critical: scale norming, adaptation, and exogenous shocks 
to life satisfaction can take place independently and simultaneously without reference 
point shifts occurring.
A concern for research using life satisfaction scales is that it is challenging to distinguish 
scale norming, adaptation, and changing reference points without information beyond scale 
responses. Consider the long-running study of the SWB of people with spinal injuries. 
While adaptation to spinal injury and other injuries is far from complete (Lucas, 2007), 
it does seem to occur to some extent (Hanson et al., 1993). Scale norming might also be 
occurring (van Leeuwen et al., 2012; Schwarz et al., 2018). People may report 7/10 before 
their injury and again 3 years after, but these 7 s correspond to different levels of underly-
ing life satisfaction. Kahneman (1999) argues that the life satisfaction of people with spinal 
injuries could also be explained by changing reference points. Scale norming occurs, with 
the injured moving over time to assess their lives within the context of their injuries. This 
revised context helps to ease the psychological pain of the injury, and latent life satisfaction 
rises as a result.
A range of SW-B findings need to be regarded as open in light of the inability to sepa-
rate scale-norming, adaptation, and reference point effects. International comparisons of 
life satisfaction, for example, may be riven with measurement error from differences in 
reporting style. There is some evidence for this for the sub-domain of income satisfaction 
Fig. 7  Changing reference points. Notes: Reference points shifts are when scale norming causes a change in 
feelings. This occurs between waves 2–3. The downward shift in the scale causes an improvement in latent 
life satisfaction. The dashed line indicates where latent life satisfaction would be had only scale norming 
occurred rather than a reference point shift
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from a study by Kapteyn et  al. (2013). They find that after adjusting for the use of dis-
crepant scales using vignettes, difference in income satisfaction between Americans and 
the Dutch in raw data disappears. This concern generalises to any intergroup comparison 
where the objective context of the two groups is meaningfully different, such as rural–urban 
or between cultures. Finally, the possibility of scale norming suggests that we should be 
cautious about presenting and comparing the effect sizes of various treatments on life sat-
isfaction. Unfortunately, the accurate measurement of effect sizes is important in welfare 
analysis for policy. Welfare analysis requires a comparison between the latent life satisfac-
tion, li*, of individuals and the monotonic aggregation of such latent life satisfactions into 
group welfare, such as in social welfare functions (Adler, 2019). Scale norming can easily 
muddle this process, producing unintended consequences.
4  Empirical Evidence for Scale Norming and Biased Reporting
There is some evidence for scale norming from vignette studies. Kapteyn et al. (2013) has 
already been mentioned. In an earlier paper, Kapteyn et al. (2010) reported similar findings 
where the difference in the marginal effect of income on life satisfaction between Dutch 
and American respondents disappeared after controlling for scale inconsistency. Ange-
lini et al. (2013) found large differences in scale use across 10 European countries. After 
correcting for these using vignettes, Denmark fell from the most satisfied nation to 5th. 
Another vignette study by Montgomery (2017) found that correcting for discrepant scale 
use reduced the marginal effect of being a woman on life satisfaction from 0.09 to 0.04.
There is also a relatively large body of research on ‘response shift’ that attests to the 
existence of scale norming (Daltroy et al., 1999; Lacey et al., 2008; Schwarz & Sprang-
ers, 2000). The response shift literature is concerned with understanding whether people 
affected by medical conditions and treatment experience changes in ‘quality of life’, meas-
ured using a variety of metrics. As in life satisfaction studies, a challenge to this research is 
people using different standards to evaluate their life before and after afflictions and treat-
ment. McClimans et al. (2012) present an instructive example (p. 1862). A gentleman in 
the early stages of chemotherapy was asked “were you limited in pursuing your hobbies 
or other leisure time activities?”. He answered: “my hobby is working in the garden, that’s 
very difficult, quite a bit”. Four weeks later, he is asked the same question and replies: 
“I’m reading at the moment; gardening is not possible anymore, a little”. It is unclear to 
what extent the chemotherapy has affected this individual’s life. On a revealed preferences 
account, the man would clearly prefer to garden than read, otherwise he would have read 
when both options were available. However, it’s possible that having been forced to read 
by chemotherapy, the gentlemen discovered that he quite enjoyed reading and the activ-
ity compensated for lost quality of life from gardening. The response shift literature is 
interested in teasing apart changes in the man’s quality of life from measurement issues. 
A paper by Ubel et  al. (2010) links this literature directly to scale norming. The paper 
argues (p. 465) that the response shift literature “lumps together sources of measurement 
error (e.g. scale recalibration) with true causes of changing quality of life (e.g. hedonic 
adaptation)”.
Schwarz et  al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 19 response shift studies. They 
found evidence for response shift (scale norming) across the studies and significant hetero-
geneity in the sign of the effect. Encouragingly, the size of the effect was generally small. 
They write that (p. 1540):
Scale Norming Undermines the Use of Life Satisfaction Scale…
1 3
One may tend to conclude that response shifts are a common and significant phe-
nomenon in QOL measurement, implying that people adapt their internal stand-
ards of QOL in response to changing health state. We found that overall the effect 
size of response shift phenomena published to date are relatively small according 
to Cohen’s (1992) criteria. Even a small response shift may, however, result in an 
underestimation of the true QOL change, i.e. concluding that it is small when it is 
moderate, or moderate when it is large.
While the small effect sizes Schwarz et  al. observed are arguably unproblematic in 
the quality of life context, they are more pernicious to many policy applications of life 
satisfaction data. For example, cost–benefit analysis would be distorted when compar-
ing interventions afflicted by different degrees of scale norming. Scale norming could 
also compound over time, especially when driven by ceiling effects, limiting the useful-
ness of life satisfaction scale data for longitudinal analysis. Trends in life satisfaction 
would give a distorted picture of social progress, for example, or long term gains from 
structural changes in policy settings.
One concern with the response shift literature is that it mostly relies on the ‘thentest’ 
methodology to determine the extent of scale norming (Schwarz & Sprangers, 2010). 
The thentest is any kind of retrospective pretest–posttest design such as Stillman et al.’s 
(2015) question to the Tongan migrants of “how did you feel when you last lived in 
Tonga?”. Effective implementation of the thentest requires an experimental design with 
treatment and control groups. A significant discrepancy between the pretest-thentest 
scores of the experimental and control groups suggests scale norming. This is espe-
cially the case if objective indicators of quality of life would suggest a discrepancy, as 
with the rising incomes of the Tongan migrants to New Zealand. However, even in such 
case, there are three concerns with the then-test. Schwarz and Sprangers (2010, p. 457) 
explain:
The first disadvantage of the thentest is that the basic premise of a shared internal 
standard by thentest and posttest has not been unequivocally supported (compare 
Sprangers et al., 1999 to Nolte et al., 2009). Second, the thentest is susceptible to 
recall bias, given its retrospective nature (Ahmed et al., 2005; Rapkin & Schwarz, 
2004; Schwarz et  al., 2004). Third, there is the potential contamination due to 
other alternative explanations, such as social desirability responding, and effort 
justification (Howard & Dailey, 1979). Further, the thentest is prone to implicit 
theories of change, where patients use a general heuristic for thinking about times 
past and infer what their initial state must have been (Norman, 2003).
Schwarz and Sprangers (2010) offer recommendations for best practice in research 
design when applying the thentest. These are outside the scope of discussion here, but 
important for analysing scale norming in life satisfaction studies going forward. What 
is relevant to the present paper is their concern about “potential contamination due to…
social desirability responding, and effort justification…implicit theories of change”. 
There is a tendency among SWB scholars to use the latter two of these concerns to dis-
miss evidence of scale norming as a function of ‘bias’ and thereby justify the status quo. 
But while it is sensible to be concerned about these issues, they are arguably an inex-
tricable part of the reporting function. Current methods of collecting life satisfaction 
scale data do not obviate against them, as will be explained below. As such, the only 
robust way forward in life satisfaction research is to take the cognitive complexity of the 
reporting function seriously and unpack it empirically.
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Effort justification is where people validate sacrifices they made to realise a goal by 
elevating the attractiveness of that goal. For example, an ambitious lawyer might work hard 
to become partner at a firm but find that the job is not as good as they expected. However, 
they convince themselves that it is actually excellent to justify all the sunk investment they 
made to reach their present position. In the context of life satisfaction change, imagine a 
respondent who reports 8/10 in both waves 1 and 2 of a survey, while also saying that their 
life is better now than before (as in Köke & Perino, 2017). This could be taken as evidence 
of scale norming, but could also be the product of effort justification. In the quality of life 
studies literature, there is often some objective yardstick against which ‘better life’ can be 
judged. This allows researchers to reasonably claim that someone’s life is not better even 
if they say it is. For example, someone might say that they feel more energetic, but objec-
tively they still can’t walk up a flight of stairs. Unfortunately, such objective indicators are 
fewer in the SWB space. Moreover, the whole point is to measure subjective well-being. 
This makes it more difficult (but also more imperative) to prove effort justification rather 
than merely invoke it.
An instructive example of theories of change comes from Ross (1989). He assessed peo-
ple’s study skills using objective measures and self-reports. He then put students through 
a course designed to improve their study skills. Objectively, the course had no effect on 
skills. Student self-reports seemed to parallel this, with students who were objectively 6/10 
also assessing themselves as 6/10. However, at the end of the course, Ross had students 
recall their study skills from the start of the course. Students who reported themselves as 
6/10 at the end of the course would remember themselves as 4/10 from the start of the 
course. They downgraded their earlier assessment because of an implicit theory that the 
course would improve their study skills. Ross’ experiment shows how theories of change 
could explain the apparent scale norming of the Tongan migrants in Stillman et al.’s (2015) 
study.
Ross’ (ibid.) experiment makes clear how theories of change can be a concern in SWB 
assessment, but its experimental context is significantly different from assessment of life 
satisfaction. Multiple lines of inquiry into subjective well-being give a central and pos-
itive role to theories of change. Narrative therapy works by helping patients order their 
lives according to a theory of change (Angus & McLeod, 2004). Eudaimonic theories of 
well-being emphasise self-actualisation (Fabian, 2020). This involves positing some ideal 
or true self that one is progressing towards over time, which is necessitates a theory of 
change. Goal setting and achievement, which is widely implicated in subjective well-being, 
is similarly impossible without some theory of change. More broadly, theories of change 
are likely to inform the reporting process. The ranking problem, for example, might involve 
ordering a possible life, la, higher than another, lb, because inherent in la is greater progress 
towards some desired outcome. The calibration problem could be influenced by how an 
individual breaks down incremental steps in an implicit theory of change. For example, 
they may associate a 6/10 with graduating, a 7/10 with getting married, an 8/10 with buy-
ing a house, and a 9/10 with having kids. Constructing a standard and assessing one’s life 
against it is likely to involve an implicit theory of change because life is a dynamic, inten-
tional, process. We therefore need to conceptually differentiate between erroneous theories 
of change, depicted in Ross’ (ibid.) study, and germane theories of change that provide a 
framework for SWB evaluations.
The discussion above addressed the complexity of invoking effort justification and 
implicit theories of change as explanations for trends in life satisfaction scale data that 
might otherwise indicate scale norming, such as the observations in GSOEP and BHPS 
discussed in the introduction to this paper. This leaves issues of recall bias and errors of 
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memory unaddressed. To this end, the second half of this paper analyses an experiment 
that explores scale norming in such a way that its results are hard to dismiss as merely the 
product of recall bias. The purpose of this experiment is to contribute to the empirical evi-
dence that scale norming is a real phenomenon in life satisfaction scale data, not merely the 
product of cognitive biases. The experiment is not a test or illustration of the conceptual 
framework outlined in parts 1 and 2 of the paper. That would require a much more sophisti-
cated and resource-intensive survey.
5  An experiment to assess scale norming as the product of recall bias
The study of life satisfaction over time typically involves plotting year-on-year responses to 
life satisfaction scale responses into a time series. Figure 8 provides an illustrative example 
from the first 10 waves (2001–2010) of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics of 
Australia (HILDA) panel. The x-axis tracks the waves of the survey, while the y-axis shows 
average life satisfaction within the sample measured using the following life satisfaction 
scale question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life at this time on a 
scale of 1–10?”.
If scale norming occurs over time, we might expect to see a different shape in the time 
series of life satisfaction if we ask respondents to assess an entire period using a single 
scale. This intuition was used to inform a simple survey question, the life satisfaction plot, 
depicted in Fig. 9. As in Fig. 8, the x-axis tracks time while the y-axis tracks life satisfac-
tion. Respondents are presented with this graph and asked the following:
Question 1: In the area below, please draw a line graph depicting your life satisfac-
tion levels over the past 10 years:
Respondents were also asked the life satisfaction scale question from HILDA:






















HILDA - WHOLE SAMPLE (AGE + POSTGRAD)
Fig. 8  Average life satisfaction of postgraduates aged 17–35 in HILDA, 2001–2010
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Question 2: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life at this time 
on a scale of 1–10?
As well as the following retrospective question:
Question 3: Think back to 10 years ago. Meditate for a moment on the activities you 
did, the concerns you had, the good and bad things that were in your life and how 
happy or sad you were. Place yourself back in your mind at the time.
10 years ago, what would you have answered to the following question: all things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life on a scale of 1–10?
Scale-norming can be investigated by comparing trends in life satisfaction plots with 
responses to the two scale questions. If respondents show significant change in one direc-
tion in their life satisfaction plots but no commensurate change (or an inverse change) in 
their scale response from  t1 to  t10 this would suggest (though not prove definitively) that 
they are scale-norming. A high scale response score for  t1 coupled with a sustained upward 
trend in their plot would add further credence to this inference as this might indicate ceiling 
effects kicking in. Adaptation can be studied by looking for convergence back to a baseline 
following shocks. The 10-year time horizon provides enough scope for this to occur.
5.1  Data and Methods
The three-part survey was administered to two samples. The first consisted of 278 masters 
students at a top 100 research intensive university. The survey was administered by hand in 
this instance. A transparency with a 10 × 10 grid on it was overlaid onto the plots drawn by 
respondents to derive life satisfaction scores from 1 to 10 (in increments of 0.5) for years 
1–10. This process quantifies the shape of the plots. The second sample consisted of 1050 
Australians representative by age, gender, and location (see “Appendix 1” for summary 
statistics of demographic variables). In this case, the survey was administered online with 
the help of IPSOS/i-view, a reputable polling and market research company. The respond-
ents drew their plots using a 10 × 10 grid of boxes that they could click across to create 
a line graph, with the software connecting the dots for them. The survey questions were 
Fig. 9  Life satisfaction plot. 
Notes: sample restricted to indi-
viduals aged 17–35 who obtain 
a postgraduate qualification by 
wave 10
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permuted in both samples; by class in the student sample (6 groups) and at the individual 
level in the online sample. This permutation had no noteworthy effects on responding (see 
“Appendix 2” for a full analysis).
Three further variables necessary to investigate scale norming are calculated from 
responses to the three survey questions. These are:
• The net change in respondents’ life satisfaction from  t1 to  t10 as depicted in their plots, 
i.e. question 3. This variable is defined as2:
• The total volume of absolute change, positive or negative, in their plots, defined as:
• The change in their life satisfaction as reported in their responses to the scale questions, 
i.e. questions 1 and 2, defined as:
Where “now” corresponds to the life satisfaction scale question about present satis-
faction, and “then” corresponds to the question about satisfaction ten years ago.
6  Results
Table 1 and Figs. 10, 11, 12 and 13 provide summary statistics broken out by sample. The 
student sample experienced markedly more appreciation in their life satisfaction, with an 
average net change (plotted) of 2.6 and an average change (in scale response) of 1.2 com-


















































































change = LifeSatisfactionnow − LifeSatisfactionthen
Table 1  Summary statistics for 
key variables by sample
Full sample Students Online
Variable Mean S.D Mean S.D MEAN S.D
Total change 5.1 4.6 5.4 3.8 5.0 4.8
Net change 0.7 3.5 2.6 3.0 0.3 3.4
Change 0.3 2.4 1.2 2.0 0.1 2.5
LSAT “Now” 7.0 2.0 7.7 1.2 6.9 2.1
LSAT “Then” 6.7 2.1 6.4 1.8 6.8 2.1
Obs 1328 278 1050
2 Net change could also be represented as  t10 −  t1, but 76 respondents in the student sample drew narrow 
plots and thus had missing values for some early and/or late time periods when the 10 × 10 transparency 
was overlaid onto their graphs. The specification of net change above overcomes this problem without 










Total Change Net Change Scale Change
Reported Changes in Life Satisfaction
Full Student Online
Fig. 10  Reported changes in life satisfaction across plots and scales by sample
Fig. 11  Life Satisfaction “then” versus life satisfaction “now”
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Fig. 12  Distribution of life satisfaction scale responses by sample
Fig. 13  Average trends in plotted life satisfaction by sample
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only 0.1. Both samples show similar volumes of total change with an average of 5.4 among 
the students and 5 for the online sample.
6.1  Scale‑norming analysis
A respondent with strong movement in one direction in their plot who does not show any 
commensurate change in their scale response may be scale-norming over time. A graphi-
cal example drawn from the experimental data is depicted in Fig. 14. The individual has a 
discrepancy in their plot of + 5 but their scale response doesn’t change at all from ten years 
ago to today. This makes little sense unless the individual’s scale changes qualitatively over 
that period.
This phenomenon can be explored by adopting a loose definition of scale-norming 
designed to catch any potential candidates and then gradually tightening the defini-
tion to weed out reasonable respondents. This honest approach makes clear how tight 
the definition needs to be before the phenomenon disappears. Scale-norming is ini-
tially defined as having an absolute value of net change of greater than or equal to one 
Fig. 14  Example of scale-norm-
ing from plotting experiment

























LIFE SATISFACTION PLOT FOR A14
Fig. 15  Example of scale-norm-
ing by wide definition


























LIFE SATISFACTION PLOT FOR B44
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standard deviation but an absolute value of scale change of less than or equal to 1 i.e. 
the smallest amount of non-zero scale change possible. Intuitively, what this definition 
does is ask whether someone has had meaningful movement in their life satisfaction as 
plotted but this movement has not shown up proportionately in their scale responses.
The loose definition returns 157 candidates, or 11.8% of the full sample. However, 
many of these are making arguably reasonable responses, such as a net change of 3.5 for 
a change of 1. Perhaps this is simply how much life improvement is required to generate 
an increase in the bounded scale, in which ‘space’ is scarcer than in the plot. The defini-
tion is therefore tightened in the next step of the analysis: the threshold for net change 
is retained at one standard deviation, but the threshold for change is reduced to less than 
1 (i.e. no movement). This leaves only 71 candidates, or 5.3% of the sample. Some of 
these quite clearly show scale-norming, such as one individual reporting a net change of 
Table 2  Number of unique respondents potentially scale norming by sample
Number in brackets is the number of candidates as a percentage of sample in question. The final row sums 
candidates from the medium definition and additional unique candidates from the wide definition to give a 
(debatable) total number of individuals scale-norming
Scale-norming definition Full sample Students Online
(Weak) Net change >  = 1 S.D. |change|< = 1 157 (11.8%) 53 (19.1%) 114 (10.9%)
(Medium) Net change >  = 1 S.D. |change|< 1 71 (5.3%) 16 (5.8%) 57 (5.4%)
(Strong) Net change >  = 2 S.D. |change|< 1 20 (1.5%) 6 (2.2%) 18 (1.7%)
(Wide) Net change >  = 2 S.D. |change|< = 1 31 (2.3%) 11 (4%) 25 (2.4%)
[TOTAL] Unique (Medium) + (Wide) 82 (6.2%) 21 (7.6%) 64 (6.1%)
Fig. 16  Example of a reverser























LIFE SATISFACTION PLOT FOR C3
Table 3  Number of unique 
reversers by sample
Number in brackets is the number of candidates as a percentage of 
sample in question
Reversal definition Full sample Students Online
Netchange > 0 but change < 0 52 (3.9%) 17 (6.1%) 35 (3.3%)
Netchange < 0 but change > 0 51 (3.8%) 9 (3.2%) 42 (4%)
Total 103 (7.8%) 26 (9.3%) 77 (7.3%)
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9 and a scale change of 0. Indeed, there are 20 respondents (1.5%) showing an absolute 
net change of more than 2 standard deviations (i.e. 7 +) but no scale change whatsoever.
In a final step, a strict but wide definition of normalisation is used where respondents 
are considered to have normalised if they report 2 standard deviations of net change or 
more (i.e. 7 +) but no more than 1 unit of scale response change. Such individuals show 
a large change in their life satisfaction in their plots but not a proportionate change in 
their scale response. A graphical example of such a respondent is presented in Fig. 15. 
This individual has a netchange of + 9 but a scale change of only + 1. It is debatable 
whether these individuals are scale-norming. In any case, there are only 11 respondents 
of this sort who are not counted in the second phase of tightening. Adding these two 
groups together gives 82 candidates, or 6.2 per cent of the sample. The total number of 
candidates rises inconsequently to 6.4% if the full sample is broken out into the student 
and online sub samples as they have divergent standard deviations for net change. These 
encouragingly low numbers are summarised in Table 2.
There are additional candidates for scale-norming who have not yet been considered—
reversers. A reverser is someone whose scale response moves in the opposite direction to 
their plot, such as the respondent in Fig. 16. They plot an increase of life satisfaction of 
4.5 but their scale response declines by −4. This makes little sense unless the individual 
is scale-norming over time. There are 103 reversers in the full sample. A more detailed 
breakdown is provided in Table 3. 98 of these reversers do not appear in either the medium 
or wide definition of scale norming. Adding them to the 82 unique scale norming candi-
dates from the full sample yields 180 individuals whose responding is consistent with scale 
norming. This is 13.6% of the sample, a less encouraging number.
6.2  Adaptation analysis
The conceptual analysis above implied that the strength and speed of adaptation observed 
in longitudinal life satisfaction studies (Sheldon & Lucas, 2014) may be overestimated due 
to an inability to account for scale norming. To investigate the severity of this concern, 
the section below explores adaptation dynamics in the plot data. The investigation begins 
Fig. 17  Example of adaptation
A92—Total Change: 7.5, Netchange: –0.5, Satisfaction “Then”: 8.5, Satisfaction “Now”: 
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as before with a weak definition that should capture all relevant respondents. This is then 
tightened. The weak definition is total change (in plot) of more than 1, but less than or 
equal to 1 net change (in plot) and less than one absolute value of change (in scale). Intui-
tively, this should capture respondents who have experienced shock(s) to their life satisfac-
tion (total change) but then adapted back to their set point over time (hence limited net 
change and change). An example respondent is depicted below (Fig. 17). They experience 
a substantial deterioration in their life satisfaction over the 10 years of the plot, but almost 
entirely adapt back to their original level by the end of the period.
This very weak definition of adaptation picks up only 147 possible adapters out of 1127 
individuals who have experienced the requisite total change. If the required amount of total 
change is increased to 1 standard deviation, the number of candidates halves to 75 out of 
640 respondents with the requisite shocks. These aren’t large shocks to adapt to, and yet 
we see few individuals adapting to them in the manner typically identified by longitudinal 
studies using life satisfaction scales. These definitions might be discounting people who 
experience a large shock but do not have time in the 10 year stretch to adapt all the way to 
baseline. A wide definition is employed to examine this possibility. It is specified as total 
change of two standard deviations or more but a net change of no more than 1 standard 
deviation and a (scale) change of no more than 1. This yields 86 candidates out of 276 
who have experienced sufficient total change. 49 of these candidates are unique and do 
not appear in earlier definitions of adaptation. This rate of adaptation is slower than what 
appears in longitudinal studies using scales. A summary of these results is provided in 
Table 4, along with breakouts by sub sample. Interestingly, a larger portion of respondents 
adapt back, albeit only partially, to the large shocks than the smaller ones. Perhaps our per-
ception of adaptation as a strong force is driven in part by our study of dramatic events like 
Table 4  Adaptation results
Weak: Total change > 1, Net change <  = 1, (scale) Change < 1
Tight: Total change > 1 S.D., Net change <  = 1, (scale) Change < 1
Wide: Total change >  = 2 S.D., Net change <  = 1 S.D., (scale) 
Change < 1
Column 1 is the total number of candidates meeting the criteria
Column 2 is the number of individuals in the full sample with suffi-
cient total change to meet the criteria
Column 3 is the number of candidates as a percentage of those with 
sufficient total change
Column 4 is the number of candidates as a percentage of the full sam-
ple
Adaptation definition 1 2 3 (%) 4 (%)
Weak (full sample) 147 1127 13 11
Tight (full sample) 75 640 11.7 5.6
Wide (full sample) 86 276 31.2 6.5
Weak (students) 11 267 4.1 4
Tight (students) 7 176 4 2.5
Wide (students) 7 54 13 2.5
Weak (online) 136 860 15.8 13
Tight (online) 69 507 13.6 6.6
Wide (online) 42 98 43 4
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divorce and spinal injury? Adaptation may be rarer or weaker following relatively minor 
shocks.
7  Discussion
Overall, the plot instrument seems to produce different time series of life satisfaction com-
pared to longitudinal scale studies. In particular, adaptation is rare in the plots, occurring 
in about 11% of people experiencing a shock in the full sample (rows 3 and 4 of column 
4 in Table  4). This suggests that we should explore alternate ways of measuring of life 
satisfaction besides scales to discern which empirical regularities are shared across empiri-
cal instruments. If we see different patterns in the data depending on which measurement 
instrument we are using, then we need to justify why one instrument is more trustworthy 
or accurate than others. Scale norming is roughly as prevalent as adaptation, occurring in 
13.6% of the full sample. Research on adaptation to date has rarely taken seriously the pos-
sibility of scale norming as an alternate explanation of their results (Odermatt & Stutzer, 
2019 is a rare exception). It would be appropriate for future studies to investigate scale nor-
ming where possible, or at least acknowledge it as an alternate explanation.
Given that the plot metric involves 10 years of recall, some might argue that the data 
it produces is riddled with recall bias. This may well be the case, but as the plot question 
is asked alongside the life satisfaction 10 years ago on a scale question, recall bias should 
affect both responses identically. As such, recall bias does not explain the discrepancy 
between life satisfaction as reported on the plots versus the scale questions. Yet, crucially, 
it is the discrepancy that implies scale norming over time.
Some readers might also be concerned that the data do not definitively prove the exist-
ence of scale norming. Notably, they could also be explained by reference point shifts. 
There are two rejoinders to make here. First, the purpose of this study was not to prove 
the existence of scale norming, but rather to show that even when recall bias is somewhat 
controlled for, the same patterns consistent with scale norming that we see in longitudinal 
panels like the GSOEP still emerge. Therefore, we should not assume that recall bias is suf-
ficient explanation for these patterns. Second, as noted earlier, reference point shifts involve 
scale norming. What differentiates reference point shifts is that this scale norming pro-
vokes a real change in feelings. If scale norming exists in any form then we need to develop 
ways to account for it in welfare analysis or risk biasing our results.
The two samples possess properties that make the results robust to several other con-
cerns. First, the three questions were delivered to online respondents amidst 57 other ques-
tions,3 and they were unable to go back and check what they had answered to previous 
questions. This could be expected to reduce respondents’ ability to make sure that they had 
answered the questions in a consistent manner, thereby giving a more honest picture, but 
may also lead to more errors of memory. Conversely, the student sample provides a tighter 
test of recall bias in responding as the three questions are administered one after the other. 
However, the students can easily check that their answers are logically consistent, so their 
sample is likely to understate the prevalence of scale norming. This is worth noting as 
results consistent with scale norming are already more prevalent among the students com-
pared to the online sample (7.6% versus 6.1%).
3 To reduce well-established concerns around framing and priming affecting life satisfaction responses 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001), each question in the online survey was preceded by a benign question 
such as how often the individual skips breakfast or whether they are a night owl or morning person.
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Second, the y-axis in the plot metric was labelled from ‘low’ to ‘high’ rather than 1–10 
to place an emphasis on the shape and trajectory of life satisfaction over time and move 
away from scale reporting. To assess whether this had any effect on responding, a random 
sub-sample of 200 online respondents was given a plot with the y-axis labelled from 1 to 
10. This had no statistically significant impact on their reporting (see “Appendix 3”).
Finally, some might perceive the plotting questions as complex and thus hard to answer 
accurately. To investigate this, all online responses were covertly timed. The median time to 
answer the plot is 61 s. This shows both that respondents took the time to think through their 
answer and that it was not too challenging. 61 s is longer than the median times taken to 
answer the life satisfaction ‘now’ and ‘then’ scale questions, which are 11 and 24 s respec-
tively (such quick times are common in this research). However, it is less time than answer-
ing 10 consecutive scale questions (i.e. 110–240 s), which suggests that respondents do not 
find the plot more cognitively challenging to answer than a scale question, merely more time 
consuming.
While the study is robust to some concerns it certainly has significant limitations. 
The most important is that it cannot definitively demonstrate the existence of scale 
norming because it does not involve data on the qualitative meaning of the points on 
respondent’s scales. While the trends discussed are certainly consistent with scale nor-
ming, they could also be driven by very wide intervals between points on a respondent’s 
scale, such that a very large net change is not enough to provoke a scale change. Revers-
ers could be explained by careless responding, though their numerousness makes this 
unlikely. Future longitudinal studies should consider asking respondent’s to describe 
their scales verbally, such as in one tweet (280 characters) per response category. These 
descriptions could then be compared across time to assess similarity. Respondents could 
be asked directly whether they think their scale today as they have described it is mean-
ingfully similar to their scale from prior survey waves. Higher frequency longitudinal 
designs could also reduce the reliance on recall of the present study. For example, fol-
lowing Köke and Perino (2017), a study could ask respondents monthly whether they 
are more, less, or as satisfied with their life as in the previous month. This is a short 
recall window. These responses could be used to generate the kind of time series plots 
used in the methodology of this paper, but with much less reason to fear recall bias. 
This plot could then be compared to annual life satisfaction scale responses to assess 
scale norming.
A second, related limitation is that the study provides little insight into the nature of the 
reporting function and cannot offer guidance on how to control for scale norming. Unfortunately, 
unpacking the reporting function rigorously is extremely challenging and will likely require sub-
stantial methodological innovation, so offering practical guidance at this stage is impossible. 
One potential approach is the use of cognitive interviewing. This involves having respondents 
“think out loud” when answering psychometric questions. The conceptual framework presented 
herein could be used to inform semi-structured questions for such cognitive interviewing. For 
example, after answering a life satisfaction scale question, interviewees could be asked whether 
they thought about their families and society when answering the question or just themselves. 
This could shed some light on the scope problem. If such cognitive interviewing where applied 
as part of evaluations of wellbeing interventions, such as gratitude studies, it could potentially 
illuminate the differences between exogenous changes in life satisfaction due to external shocks 
like COVID-19, endogenous changes through deliberate reference point shifts, adaptation, and 
scale norming. Another option is the to use vignettes or recalled life satisfaction to anchor lon-
gitudinal life satisfaction responses and estimate potential scale norming, as described in Kaiser 
(2020). This methodology has substantial limitations but can at least allow for an analysis of the 
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sensitivity of results to scale norming. Developing methods to identify, assess, and control for 
scale norming in empirical work should be a high priority for life satisfaction research going 
forward.
Aside from scale norming evidence being robust to recall bias, perhaps the main takeaway 
from the experiment is that people can experience sustained trends in their life satisfaction over 
time without this showing up in their scale responses. This cautions against the use of longitu-
dinal trends in life satisfaction scale responses to track social progress, as real change may be 
obfuscated by scale norming over time. The discrepancy between the shape of plots and time 
trends in scale responses also suggests that we should be cautious about developing theories of 
adaptation in life satisfaction from life satisfaction scale data alone, as scales make it easy for 
researchers to confuse adaptation and scale norming.
8  Conclusions
The notion of scale norming has been around since the early days of hedonic psychology 
(Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999) but has received limited investigation compared to related 
phenomena like adaptation. Quality of life studies have examined response shift relatively 
extensively, but limited work has been done to port concepts, methods, and results over from 
that literature to life satisfaction scale scholarship. Now is an opportune time to do this for 
two reasons. First, advocacy is growing for greater use of life satisfaction data in economics 
and public policy where the scale norming is potentially highly pernicious. And second, the 
field of subjective well-being has attained sufficient latitude in recent decades to undertake 
an excavation of its methodological foundations without undermining its credibility.
This paper made several contributions to this project. First, it further developed a formal 
model of the reporting function that illuminates the distinction between adaptation, scale 
norming, and reference point shifts in the context of life satisfaction scale questions. Sec-
ond, it used this model to explain why effort justification and implicit theories of change 
are fundamental to life satisfaction reporting and are thus not good alternate explanations 
for data that might indicate scale norming over time. Third, it presented results from an 
experiment that suggest that when recall bias and errors of memory are at least partially 
controlled for, scale norming still shows up. The paper thus addresses the three main ‘cog-
nitive biases’ used to hold off concerns regarding life satisfaction scale research related 
to scale norming. This is a call to action: the field needs to take the cognitive complexity 
of answering life satisfaction scales more seriously, unpack the reporting function empiri-
cally, and ascertain the extent and severity of scale norming.
This is not to say that you cannot use life satisfaction scales for many applications in 
psychology, social science, and even policy. Scales at least remain psychometrically valid. 
However, we must be careful about aggregating effect sizes derived from scale data, espe-
cially in longitudinal research. Unfortunately, it is precisely aggregation that we need for 
cost–benefit analysis, and longitudinal research that we need for measuring social progress. 
Alternate indicators of well-being used in such policy applications have their own meas-
urement problems of course, so this word of caution applies to everyone invested in this 
debate.
Appendix 1: Summary statistics of demographic variables
Besides the 3 survey questions, no other data was collected from the student sample. Sum-
mary statistics reported here are only for the online sample, N = 1050 (Table 5).
Scale Norming Undermines the Use of Life Satisfaction Scale…
1 3
Appendix 2: Permutation of Questions
Splitting the full sample into 6 groups according to the order in which they received the 
survey questions turns up only one statistically significant effect associated with question 
order (see Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12). Respondents in the order “then, plot, now” 
seem to report less total change in life satisfaction that respondents in other groups. There 
are no differences on other variables, and the absolute magnitude of this effect is at most 
1.1 points (compared to the “now, plot, then” order—see Table 5). It is unclear from these 
results what might be driving this result.
Table 5  Summary statistics of 
demographic variables for online 
sample
Incomes are in Australian dollars, worth roughly 0.6 USD
Variable % Variable %
Age: 18–25 11.9 Employed full time 31.5
Age: 26–35 17.9 Employed part time 18.3
Age: 36–45 17.3 Not employed 52.6
Age: 46–55 12.3 Professional/Managerial 19
Age: 56–65 1.7 Unskilled/labour 4.5
Age: 65 + 38.9 Sales/clerical 10.6
Male 48.9 Technical/skilled 7.8
Female 51.1 Other occupations 7.4
High school drop out 11.9 Income: < 15,000 4.5
Finished High school 17.3 Income: 15 000–24 999 9.2
Skilled vocational 16.7 Income: 25 000–34 999 10.5
Associate diploma 10.2 Income: 35 000–49 999 28.7
Bachelor’s 20.6 Income: 50 000–74 999 15.6
Some postgraduate 15 Income: 75 000–99 999 12.1
Married 47.7 Income: 100 000–149,999 15.6
Living with partner 13 Income: 150 000–199,999 6.7
Divorced/separated 10.6 Income: 200 000 + 2.9
Widowed 5.7 Income: refused to disclose 9.9
Single/never married 22.1
More than 5 km from town 2.7
Rural town 16.4




Table 6  Summary statistics (full sample)
Means, with standard deviation in parentheses. The difference in group size is driven by differences in the 
sizes of the student classes. The high variance of total change in the “plot, now, then” group appears to be 














LSATT 6.725225 6.7 6.903922 6.411638 6.8 6.752792
(2.096904) (1.929603) (2.07857) (2.208248) (2.024738) (2.179743)
LS NOW 7.024554 6.840541 7.188672 6.94181 7.00431 7.180203
(1.819322) (1.803598) (1.964166) (2.286289) (1.980419) (1.956612)
TOTAL ∆ 5.40625 5.255676 5.603113 4.787554 5.081897 4.307107
(4.218277) (4.988953) (6.671715) (3.65231) (3.71521) (3.190124)
NET ∆ 0.8392857 0.3972973 1.003891 0.77897 0.8706897 0.393401
(3.527098) (3.111644) (3.679279) (3.584489) (3.545084) (3.366826)
SCALE ∆ 0.3040541 0.1405405 0.2854902 0.5301724 0.1934783 0.4274112
(2.357453) (2.280406) (2.591519) (2.55823) (2.505139) (2.296906)
N = 222 185 255 232 230 197
Table 7  t tests for statistically 
significant differences between 
question order #1 (now, plot, 
then) and other question orders
T statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 
***: 0.001
NPT NTP PNT PTN TNP TPN
LSATT 0.0252  − 0.179 0.314  − 0.0748  − 0.0276
(0.13) (− 0.93) (1.55) (− 0.39) (− 0.13)
LSATN 0.184  − 0.164 0.0827 0.0202  − 0.156
(1.02) (− 0.95) (0.43) (0.11) (− 0.84)
TOTCHANGE 0.151  − 0.197 0.619 0.324 1.099**
(0.33) (− 0.39) (1.67) (0.87) (3.04)
NETCHANGE 0.442  − 0.165 0.0603  − 0.0314 0.446
(1.35) (− 0.50) (0.18) (− 0.09) (1.33)
CHANGE 0.164 0.0186  − 0.226 0.111  − 0.123
(0.71) (0.08) (− 0.98) (0.48) (− 0.54)
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Table 8  t tests for statistically 
significant differences between 
question order #1 (now, then, 
plot) and other question orders
t statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 
***: 0.001
NTP NPT PNT PTN TNP TPN
LSATT  − 0.0252  − 0.204 0.288  − 0.1000  − 0.0528
(− 0.13) (− 1.06) (1.42) (− 0.51) (− 0.25)
LSATN  − 0.184  − 0.348  − 0.101  − 0.164  − 0.340
(− 1.02) (− 1.93) (− 0.51) (− 0.88) (− 1.77)
TOTCHANGE  − 0.151  − 0.347 0.468 0.174 0.949*
(− 0.33) (− 0.63) (1.07) (0.39) (2.20)
NETCHANGE  − 0.442  − 0.607  − 0.382  − 0.473 0.00390
(− 1.35) (− 1.87) (− 1.16) (− 1.45) (0.01)
CHANGE  − 0.164  − 0.145  − 0.390  − 0.0529  − 0.287
(− 0.71) (− 0.62) (− 1.64) (− 0.22) (− 1.22)
Table 9  t tests for statistically 
significant differences between 
question order #2 (plot, now, 
then) and other question orders
T statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 
***: 0.001
PNT NTP NPT PTN TNP TPN
LSATT 0.204 0.179 0.492* 0.104 0.151
(1.06) (0.93) (2.53) (0.56) (0.75)
LSATN 0.348 0.164 0.247 0.184 0.00847
(1.93) (0.95) (1.27) (1.03) (0.05)
TOTCHANGE 0.347 0.197 0.816 0.521 1.296**
(0.63) (0.39) (1.70) (1.08) (2.73)
NETCHANGE 0.607 0.165 0.225 0.133 0.610
(1.87) (0.50) (0.68) (0.41) (1.84)
CHANGE 0.145  − 0.0186  − 0.245 0.0920  − 0.142
(0.62) (− 0.08) (− 1.05) (0.40) (− 0.62)
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Table 10  t tests for statistically 
significant differences between 
question order #1 (plot, then, 
now) and other question orders
t statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 
***: 0.001
PTN PNT NTP NPT TNP TPN
LSATT  − 0.492*  − 0.288  − 0.314  − 0.388*  − 0.341
(− 2.53) (− 1.42) (− 1.55) (− 1.97) (− 1.61)
LSATN  − 0.247 0.101  − 0.0827  − 0.0625  − 0.238
(− 1.27) (0.51) (− 0.43) (− 0.31) (− 1.16)
TOTCHANGE  − 0.816  − 0.468  − 0.619  − 0.294 0.480
(− 1.70) (− 1.07) (− 1.67) (− 0.86) (1.46)
NETCHANGE  − 0.225 0.382  − 0.0603  − 0.0917 0.386
(− 0.68) (1.16) (− 0.18) (− 0.28) (1.15)
CHANGE 0.245 0.390 0.226 0.337 0.103
(1.05) (1.64) (0.98) (1.43) (0.44)
Table 11  t tests for statistically 
significant differences between 
question order #1 (then, now, 
plot) and other question orders
t statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 
***: 0.001
TNP PTN PNT NTP NPT TPN
LSATT 0.388*  − 0.104 0.1000 0.0748 0.0472
(1.97) (− 0.56) (0.51) (0.39) (0.23)
LSATN 0.0625  − 0.184 0.164  − 0.0202  − 0.176
(0.31) (− 1.03) (0.88) (− 0.11) (− 0.92)
TOTCHANGE 0.294  − 0.521  − 0.174  − 0.324 0.775*
(0.86) (− 1.08) (− 0.39) (− 0.87) (2.32)
NETCHANGE 0.0917  − 0.133 0.473 0.0314 0.477
(0.28) (− 0.41) (1.45) (0.09) (1.43)
CHANGE  − 0.337  − 0.0920 0.0529  − 0.111  − 0.234
(− 1.43) (− 0.40) (0.22) (− 0.48) (− 1.01)
Table 12  t tests for statistically significant differences between question order #1 (then, plot, now) and 
other question orders
t statistics with standard deviation in parentheses. *: 0.05 **: 0.01 ***: 0.001
TPN TNP PTN PNT NTP NPT
LSATT  − 0.0472 0.341  − 0.151 0.0528 0.0276
(− 0.23) (1.61) (− 0.75) (0.25) (0.13)
LSATN 0.176 0.238  − 0.00847 0.340 0.156
(0.92) (1.16) (− 0.05) (1.77) (0.84)
TOTCHANGE  − 0.775*  − 0.480  − 1.296**  − 0.949*  − 1.099**
(− 2.32) (− 1.46) (− 2.73) (− 2.20) (− 3.04)
NETCHANGE  − 0.477  − 0.386  − 0.610  − 0.00390  − 0.446
(− 1.43) (− 1.15) (− 1.84) (− 0.01) (− 1.33)
CHANGE 0.234  − 0.103 0.142 0.287 0.123
(1.01) (− 0.44) (0.62) (1.22) (0.54)
Scale Norming Undermines the Use of Life Satisfaction Scale…
1 3
Appendix 3: Y‑axis labelled ‘low’ to ‘high’ versus 1–10
Table  13 shows the average response by year plotted by respondents in the sub-sample 
presented with a y-axis labelled 1–10 compared to those presented with a y-axis labelled 
“low” to “high”. There is no statistically significant difference.
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